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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No.  16-2712 
___________ 
 
MATTIE HALLEY; SHEM ONDITI; LETICIA MALAVE;  
TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF 
SERGIO DE LA CRUZ,  
On Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated 
 
v. 
 
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.;  
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. 
 
                Maureen Chandra, 
                                       Appellant 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-10-cv-03345) 
District Judge: Honorable Esther Salas 
______________ 
 
ARGUED:  January 17, 2017 
 
Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE, and SCIRICA,  
Circuit Judges 
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_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This is an appeal from the approval of a settlement of a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) class action arising 
out of hexavalent chromium contamination in Jersey City, 
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New Jersey. The class action was brought on behalf of 
property owners in several neighborhoods in Jersey City 
whose homes were allegedly contaminated by byproducts 
disposed of at two chromium chemical manufacturing plants. 
Defendants Honeywell International, Inc., and PPG 
Industries, Inc., are the successors in interest of the 
manufacturing plant owners and operators. Plaintiffs asserted 
common law tort claims and civil conspiracy claims for 
depreciation of their property values due to the alleged 
contamination, but not claims for harm other than economic 
loss to property value, such as personal injury or medical 
monitoring claims. The District Court certified a settlement-
only class as to the claims against Honeywell1 and approved a 
$10,017,000 settlement fund, which included an award of 
costs and attorneys’ fees for plaintiffs’ counsel. Maureen 
Chandra is a member of the Honeywell settlement class who 
objects to various aspects of the settlement and the award of 
costs and attorneys’ fees. 
 
 We conclude the class certification requirements of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) are satisfied, 
and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
approving the settlement under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(e) and the award of attorneys’ fees under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h). But we will remand 
for the District Court to reconsider the award of costs under 
Rule 23(h). 
 
                                              
1 The settlement encompasses only the claims against 
Honeywell. Litigation of the claims against PPG is ongoing. 
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I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Chromium Production in Jersey City 
 This case involves two chromate chemical production 
facilities in Jersey City, New Jersey. Honeywell is the 
successor in interest to Mutual Chemical Company of 
America, which operated a facility from 1895 to 1954 on 
West Side Avenue. PPG is the successor in interest to 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company and Natural Refining 
Company, which operated a facility from 1924 to 1963 on 
Garfield Avenue.  
 
 Both facilities created chromium ore processing 
residue (“COPR”) as a byproduct of chemical manufacturing. 
COPR waste from the facilities was disposed of at two sites in 
Jersey City. Mutual disposed of COPR at a site near its plant 
on the west side of Jersey City, near the Hackensack River 
(“the Mutual site”). Pittsburgh Plate Glass disposed of COPR 
near its plant further east (“the Pittsburgh Plate Glass site”). 
Plaintiffs allege more than one million tons of waste products 
were disposed of at the two sites. 
 
 COPR contains hexavalent chromium,2 which the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency and the New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection classify as a 
known human carcinogen. Hexavalent chromium is 
                                              
2 The element chromium exists in multiple stable oxidation 
states in nature. Trivalent chromium, or Cr(III), is the most 
stable and found in trace amounts in the human body. 
Hexavalent chromium, or Cr(VI), is unstable and causes 
potentially harmful reactions in human cells.  
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hazardous to humans and other organisms if inhaled or 
ingested in contaminated water. 
 
 Honeywell and its predecessors in interest have been 
proceeding with COPR cleanup at the Mutual site for many 
years. See Interfaith Community Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 
399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005). The State of New Jersey first 
sought a remedy for the site in 1982, after chromium waste 
was discovered in surface water on the site. Id. at 252. Over 
the course of ongoing negotiations with NJDEP, Honeywell 
and its predecessors attempted various interim remediation 
measures, including capping parts of the site with asphalt and 
a plastic liner. Id. at 253. There have been a number of 
consent orders regarding the Honeywell site arising from 
litigation brought by NJDEP under New Jersey environmental 
protection statutes and regulations in the New Jerseys state 
courts, beginning with a 1990 consent order, and most 
recently a 2011 consent judgment, as modified in 2013.3   
 
 In 1995, a community organization and its members 
brought a federal action against Honeywell and other 
defendants to compel cleanup of the Mutual site under the 
citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). Id. at 252. The 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
determined Honeywell was required to remediate under 
RCRA and directed Honeywell to excavate and remove 
chromium waste from the Mutual site under the supervision 
of a federal-court-appointed site administrator. See id. at 268 
                                              
3 The state consent judgments are made available by the New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. 
http://www.nj.gov/dep/srp/siteinfo/chrome/ 
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(affirming injunction against Honeywell to compel cleanup of 
Mutual site).  
 
B. Procedural History 
 This action involves three putative classes of property 
owners in Jersey City in three different neighborhoods near 
the chromium manufacturing plants and related disposal sites. 
Class A includes property owners in a neighborhood east and 
south of the Mutual site. Class C includes property owners 
located in a smaller area west of Class A. Together, Class A 
and Class C include 3,497 properties. The neighborhood 
comprising Class B is in a different part of Jersey City, to the 
east of Class A and surrounding the Pittsburgh Plate Glass 
site to the north. 
 
 Plaintiffs allege both defendants negligently disposed 
of COPR and other chromium manufacturing byproducts, 
resulting in continuing contamination of the surrounding 
properties. They further allege Honeywell, PPG, and their 
predecessors, individually and in conspiracy with one 
another, concealed the fact of COPR disposal and the known 
health risks resulting from the disposal.  
 
 The Sixth Amended Complaint asserted five causes of 
action on behalf of the three putative classes: (1) private 
nuisance, (2) strict liability, (3) trespass, (4) negligence, and 
(5) civil conspiracy.4 Plaintiffs sought compensatory relief in 
the form of economic damages “for loss of property value,” 
as well as punitive damages. 
                                              
4 Plaintiffs also initially asserted claims for medical 
monitoring, which were withdrawn. 
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 Plaintiffs initially filed this action in New Jersey state 
court in 2010, and defendants removed the case to the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey. On 
February 28, 2011, the District Court granted in part and 
denied in part Honeywell’s motion to dismiss, and the case 
proceeded to discovery. On July 17, 2014, prior to the 
completion of discovery or filing of a motion for class 
certification, plaintiffs and Honeywell informed the District 
Court they had reached a settlement in principle following 
negotiations under the auspices of an independent third-party 
mediator.  
 
 On November 7, 2014, plaintiffs and Honeywell filed 
a motion for preliminary approval of the class action 
settlement. The District Court granted the motion on May 1, 
2015, and certified two classes for settlement purposes, 
comprising Class A and Class C. The District Court also 
appointed class counsel and approved the proposed claims 
administrator and form of notice.  
 
 Following notice to the class, the District Court 
received three objections from four class members, and 
twenty-eight opt-out requests. Maureen Chandra was one of 
the objectors.  
 
 After the close of the objections period, on September 
3, 2015, plaintiffs and Honeywell filed a motion for final 
approval of the class action settlement. Chandra filed a brief 
in opposition to the joint motion for settlement approval. On 
September 25, 2015, the District Court held a fairness hearing 
on the proposed settlement under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(e)(2), at which Chandra made an appearance 
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through counsel. On April 26, 2016, the District Court, as 
outlined below, certified the class for settlement purposes 
under Rule 23(a) and (b), granted final approval of the 
settlement as fair and reasonable under Rule 23(e), and 
approved plaintiffs’ counsel’s motion for costs and attorneys’ 
fees under Rule 23(h). See Halley v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 
Civil Action No. 10-3345, 2016 WL 1682943 (D.N.J. April 
26, 2016). 
 Chandra filed this appeal.5 Chandra does not dispute 
the District Court’s conclusions with respect to the 
requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b). But Chandra argues the 
District Court abused its discretion in finding the settlement 
fair and reasonable under Rule 23(e) and in awarding 
plaintiffs’ counsel attorneys’ fees and costs under Rule 23(h). 
 
C. Proposed Settlement 
 The settlement provides a $10,017,000.00 non-
reversionary settlement fund for residential property owners 
in Class A and Class C to include payments to class members, 
incentive awards for class representatives, litigation costs, 
attorneys’ fees, and fund administration expenses. The final 
breakdown of those payments is as follows: 
 
Total Fund $10,017,000.00 
                                              
5 The District Court had jurisdiction under the Class Action 
Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), because there is minimal 
diversity between the plaintiffs and Honeywell; there are at 
least 100 class members; and the amount in controversy 
exceeds $5,000,000. We have jurisdiction over the District 
Court’s final order approving the settlement under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
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Incentive Awards $20,000.00 
Litigation Costs $1,140,023.77 
Attorneys’ Fees $2,504,250.00 
Fund Administration 
Expenses 
$219,278.87 
Settlement Class Funds $6,133,447.36 
 
 The two settlement classes include 3,497 properties, 
entitled to $1,745 per potential claimant. Valid claims were 
submitted on behalf of 2,085 properties, and the unclaimed 
funds will be distributed pro rata to valid claimants. Thus, the 
final allocation per property is $2,926. 
 
II. CLASS CERTIFICATION 
 To approve a class action settlement, a district court 
must determine the requirements for class certification of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)6 and (b)7 are met. 
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619–20 
(1997). The proposed settlement may be taken into 
                                              
6 The Rule 23(a) requirements are (1) numerosity, (2) 
commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(a); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 
(1997). 
 
7 In addition to the Rule 23(a) requirements, which apply to 
all class actions, parties seeking class certification must also 
show the action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or 
(3). Only Rule 23(b)(3) is at issue in this case, which imposes 
the additional requirements of (1) predominance and (2) 
superiority. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615. 
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consideration when evaluating whether these requirements 
are met. Id.; In re Prudential Ins. Co. America Sales Practice 
Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 308 (3d Cir. 1998). We 
review the District Court’s decision to certify a class for 
settlement purposes for an abuse of discretion. Prudential, 
148 F.3d at 299. 
 
 The District Court determined the proposed settlement 
classes should be certified after concluding the requirements 
of Rule 23(a) and (b) were met. With respect to Rule 23(a), 
the Court concluded joinder of the owners of the 3,497 
properties in Classes A and C would be impractical. See 
Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226–27 (3d Cir. 2001). 
Second, the Court determined questions of fact relating to 
operation of the Mutual plant and subsequent remediation 
satisfied the commonality requirement. Third, the Court 
concluded the class representatives of Class A and Class B 
satisfied the typicality requirement through their contention 
that their respective properties have been adversely affected 
by COPR contamination resulting from Honeywell’s conduct. 
Fourth, the Court determined class counsel was qualified to 
adequately represent the class, and the interests of the class 
representatives were adequately aligned with the other class 
members because they allegedly suffered the same harm 
through COPR contamination of their property and they seek 
the same remedy. 
 
 The District Court also found the requirements of Rule 
23(b)(3) were met.  
 
The predominance requirement was satisfied because 
common issues relating to the generation, disposal, and 
failure to remediate COPR, and Mutual and Honeywell’s 
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knowledge of and negligence with respect to the effects of 
COPR disposal predominated over any individual issues. The 
Court determined the superiority requirement was met 
because the class action device achieved significant 
efficiencies compared to individual actions. 
 
 As noted, none of the objectors raised any issues with 
respect to Rule 23(a) and (b), and Chandra does not dispute 
these conclusions in this appeal. We conclude the District 
Court’s findings were well within its sound discretion. 
 
III. FAIRNESS OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides “the 
claims . . . of a certified class may be settled . . . only with the 
court’s approval.” “Even if it has satisfied the requirements 
for certification under Rule 23, a class action cannot be 
settled without the approval of the court and a determination 
that the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate.” 
Prudential, 148 F.3d at 316 (quotation omitted). When the 
parties seek simultaneous class certification and settlement 
approval, courts must “be even more scrupulous than usual 
when they examine the fairness of the proposed settlement.” 
Id. at 317 (quotation omitted). The ultimate decision whether 
to approve a proposed settlement under this standard “is left 
to the sound discretion of the district court.” Id. at 299. “An 
appellate court may find an abuse of discretion where the 
district court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding 
of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application 
of law to fact.” Id. (quotations omitted).  
 
 We have articulated a number of factors to guide 
district courts in the exercise of their discretion to approve 
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class action settlements. In Girsh v. Jepson, we identified 
nine nonexclusive factors: 
 
(1) the complexity, expense, and likely duration 
of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to 
the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings 
and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the 
risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of 
establishing damages; (6) the risks of 
maintaining the class action through the trial; 
(7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a 
greater judgment; (8) the range of 
reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of 
the best possible recovery; and (9) the range of 
reasonableness of the settlement fund to a 
possible recovery in light of all the attendant 
risks of litigation. 
 
521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975) (quotations and alterations 
omitted). In Prudential, we expanded the Girsh factors, to 
include, when appropriate, additional nonexclusive factors: 
 
[1] the maturity of the underlying substantive 
issues, as measured by experience in 
adjudicating individual actions, the 
development of scientific knowledge, the extent 
of discovery on the merits, and other factors 
that bear on the ability to assess the probable 
outcome of a trial on the merits of liability and 
individual damages; [2] the existence and 
probable outcome of claims by other classes 
and subclasses; [3] the comparison between the 
results achieved by the settlement for individual 
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class or subclass members and the results 
achieved—or likely to be achieved—for other 
claimants; [4] whether class or subclass 
members are accorded the right to opt out of the 
settlement; [5] whether any provisions for 
attorneys' fees are reasonable; and [6] whether 
the procedure for processing individual claims 
under the settlement is fair and reasonable 
148 F.3d at 323.8 
A. District Court Opinion 
 After careful consideration of each Girsh factor, the 
District Court determined the settlement was fair and 
adequate. Specifically, the Court concluded the first Girsh 
factor, the complexity, expense, and likely duration of 
litigation, weighed heavily in favor of settlement. The parties 
litigated a motion to dismiss followed by five years of 
discovery, but expert reports had not been exchanged, expert 
depositions had not been taken, and motions for class 
                                              
8 The American Law Institute has proposed streamlining and 
condensing these factors to better reflect the realities of 
modern aggregate litigation. See American Law Institute, 
Principles of Aggregate Litigation § 3.05 (2010). In August 
2016, the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure published for notice and comment 
proposed amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure. These 
amendments draw support from the ALI’s recommendations 
in the Principles of Aggregate Litigation and incorporate, 
combine, and streamline many of the Girsh and Prudential 
factors into Rule 23 itself.  
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certification had not yet been filed. The claims at issue would 
involve complicated legal and technical issues at the 
summary judgment stage and at trial. Based on the extensive 
discovery that had already taken place, the District Court also 
concluded the third Girsh factor, the stage of proceedings and 
amount of discovery completed, also weighed in favor of 
settlement. 
 
 The District Court determined the second Girsh factor, 
the reaction of the class to the settlement, strongly weighed in 
favor of settlement. Claims were submitted for 2,089 of the 
3,497 properties included in Classes A and C, representing 
almost 60% of the class. Only twenty-eight potential class 
members opted out of the settlement and three objections 
were filed. The Court concluded the “relatively minimal 
number of objections and opt-outs” weighed in favor of 
settlement. 
 
 With respect to the fourth and fifth Girsh factors, the 
risks of establishing liability and damages, the Court 
concluded there were litigation risks for both plaintiffs and 
defendants. First, the Court noted class certification had not 
yet been litigated and that there was some risk of failure for 
plaintiffs at that stage. Second, with respect to the merits, the 
Court explained there were substantial risks for both parties. 
In plaintiffs’ favor, if liability were established, the alleged 
COPR contamination would result in significant diminution 
of property values and a large damages award. But defendants 
strongly contested liability. 
 
 In particular, the Court noted defendants’ contention 
that none of the COPR disposed of at either site had actually 
migrated onto or otherwise contaminated the plaintiffs’ 
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properties. The Court explained, “Honeywell contends that 
any fear or concern regarding the presence of chromium from 
the Mutual sites is not reasonable and is contradicted by other 
discovery obtained in the case; these and other issues, like 
causation and injury, present substantial obstacles for 
certifying a litigation class.” Plaintiffs conducted no 
independent testing of class properties to determine if ground 
contamination existed due to COPR migration from the 
Mutual site, and Honeywell planned to offer expert testimony 
that no migration had occurred.  
 
 In addition, Honeywell took the position during 
litigation that the claims were time-barred given the long and 
well-publicized history of cleanup at the contaminated 
production sites. The applicable statute of limitations for 
claims of tortious injury to real property in New Jersey is six 
years. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1. The Court noted “Honeywell 
argues that considerable evidence of public awareness of the 
chromium issue in Jersey City may preclude plaintiffs’ claims 
based on statute of limitations grounds.” The litigation 
brought by NJDEP to force cleanup of the chromium 
manufacturing sites dated back to the 1980s, and was well 
publicized in Jersey City.  
 
 On balance, the District Court concluded there were 
serious questions as to liability and that a jury calculating 
damages would be presented with contrasting expert 
testimony. Because of the uncertainty with regard to class 
certification for litigation, and also with regard to liability and 
damages, the Court concluded the fourth and fifth Girsh 
factors weighed in favor of settlement. 
 
 The Court found the sixth Girsh factor, the risk of 
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maintaining the class action through trial, was neutral because 
there were no issues raised by any party that might have led 
to decertification. With respect to the seventh Girsh factor, 
defendant’s ability to withstand a greater judgment, the Court 
concluded Honeywell would have been able to withstand a 
larger settlement, and this factor weighed against the 
settlement. But the Court concluded the seventh factor was of 
relatively little importance in context because the settlement 
achieved immediate and tangible benefit for the class. 
 In addition, the District Court considered and rejected 
a challenge to the scope of the release of claims. Chandra 
argued the eighth and ninth Girsh factors could not be 
properly evaluated because of the release of “unknown” and 
“unforeseen” claims. Rejecting this contention, the Court 
reasoned the release of future, unknown claims was a 
necessary part of the bargain to obtain the benefits of the 
settlement for the class. The Court noted the settlement did 
not prevent class members from seeking remediation of their 
properties in the future through the administrative procedures 
of the New Jersey Spill Act, N.J.S.A. § 58:10-23.11, which 
require an entity who discharges a hazardous substance to 
remediate the contamination regardless of fault. 
 
 Finally, the District Court determined the eighth and 
ninth Girsh factors, the range of reasonableness of the 
settlement in light of the best possible recovery and possible 
recovery in light of all of the attendant risks of litigation, 
weighed in favor of settlement. In so doing, the Court noted 
the settling parties had not identified a specific dollar amount 
for a best possible recovery. But the Court explained 
determining the best possible recovery, without completion of 
fact and expert discovery, would “risk either being 
exceedingly speculative—or exceedingly burdensome by 
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compelling litigation to continue . . . .” The Court concluded 
the information that was available, in the form of contrasting 
studies and proffered expert testimony, demonstrated 
conflicting valuations of the case. Without the ability to place 
a value on the best possible recovery, the Court’s analysis of 
the eighth and ninth Girsh factors relied on its determination 
that the settlement “yields immediate and tangible benefits, 
and it is reasonable in light of the best possible recovery and 
the attendant risks of litigation—little or no recovery at all.” 
Halley, 2016 WL 1682943, at *15 (quoting Varacallo v. 
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 240 (D.N.J. 2005). 
Ultimately, the District Court concluded the settlement was 
fair and reasonable under Rule 23(e) because the Girsh 
factors weighed in favor of approval of the settlement. 
 
 Chandra raises four issues with respect to the Court’s 
approval of the settlement under Rule 23(e). First, Chandra 
argues the Court abused its discretion in approving the 
settlement without a record establishing the presence and 
extent of COPR contamination on class members’ properties. 
Second, she contends the Court committed clear error in what 
she characterizes as the factual finding that class members 
could still seek remediation of their properties through 
administrative proceedings under the New Jersey Spill Act, 
N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11 et seq. Third, she claims the Court 
abused its discretion because the settlement releases 
“unknown” and “unforeseen” future claims. Finally, she she 
asserts the Court abused its discretion in failing to consider 
the negative reaction of class members at a public meeting 
held by class counsel. After reviewing each of these 
arguments and for the reasons we explain, we conclude the 
District Court exercised sound discretion in approving the 
settlement under Rule 23(e) and will affirm the approval of 
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the settlement. 
 
 While the amount of the recovery for each class 
member appears troubling in light of the likely diminution of 
property values should liability be proved, five years of 
extensive fact discovery produced little evidence suggesting 
that liability could be established. This case involves only 
claims for diminution of property value due to COPR 
contamination, and personal injury or medical monitoring 
claims are not released in this settlement. Plaintiffs had 
conducted no testing to determine the extent, if any, of 
ground contamination of the class properties. Thus, the 
evidence of injury in the form of ground contamination was 
nonexistent or limited at best. The studies relied on by 
plaintiffs involved dust contamination in areas near the 
mutual site, but plaintiffs had limited evidence that the dust 
contamination was caused by COPR disposal at the Mutual 
site. Even if plaintiffs could establish injury and causation, 
the statute of limitations posed a formidable hurdle, given that 
the existence of COPR contamination at the Mutual site had 
been known for decades and the applicable statute of 
limitations was six years.  
 
 Plaintiffs likely realized it would be difficult to prove 
injury and causation and to surmount the statute of 
limitations. For its part, Honeywell, which continues to be 
responsible for cleanup and remediation at the Mutual site 
itself, was willing to pay $10 million dollars to avoid further 
litigation in this case. For these reasons, we agree with the 
District Court that the settlement “yields immediate and 
tangible benefits, and it is reasonable in light of the best 
possible recovery and the attendant risks of litigation—little 
or no recovery at all.” 
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B. Sufficiency of Record 
 Chandra argues the Court abused its discretion in 
approving the settlement without expert testimony regarding 
the presence and extent of COPR contamination on the 
properties in Class A and Class C. As noted, none of the 
experts retained by plaintiffs’ counsel conducted tests of any 
class property for COPR contamination.  
 Chandra relies on our decision in In re Pet Food 
Products Liability Litigation. 629 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 2010). In 
that case, we considered a proposed settlement of claims 
brought on behalf of a class of purchasers of tainted pet food. 
Id. at 336. The putative class was divided into several 
subclasses, including a subclass for purchasers of the tainted 
pet food who had not already received a refund from the 
retailers or manufacturers. Id. at 353. The settlement capped 
the total recovery for this purchaser subclass at $250,000. Id. 
But the settling parties produced no information to support 
their contention the $250,000 cap was sufficient to cover all 
of the possible claims in the purchaser subclass. Id. at 353–
54. Because the parties did not supply information to explain 
how the $250,000 cap was calculated, the District Court was 
unable to conduct an analysis of the Girsh factors as applied 
to that subclass. Id. at 354. We reversed the approval of the 
settlement as to only the purchaser subclass and concluded 
“where funds available for some claims are capped while 
others are not[,] the settling parties should have provided the 
court with more detailed information about why they settled 
on the $250,000 cap.” Id.  
 
 Pet Food Products also considered the District Court’s 
analysis of the eighth and ninth Girsh factors—the range of 
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reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best 
possible recovery for the class and in light of the risks of 
litigation. Id. at 354–55. We explained “‘in cases primarily 
seeking monetary relief,’ district courts should compare ‘the 
present value of the damages plaintiffs would likely recover if 
successful, appropriately discounted for the risk of not 
prevailing[,] . . . with the amount of the proposed 
settlement.’” Id. at 354 (quoting In re General Motors Corp. 
Pick-Up Truck Tank Prods. Liability Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 806 
(3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Manual for Complex Litigation 
(Second) § 30.44, at 252 (1985))). The settling parties did not 
provide estimations of the best possible recovery for the 
purchaser subclass, in particular “information identifying the 
amount of recalled pet food sold to consumers and the 
amount of refunds already paid to customers.” Id. at 355. We 
explained this best recovery was relevant because it would 
have enabled the District Court to “make the required value 
comparisons and generate a range of reasonableness to 
determine the adequacy of the settlement amount.” Id. (citing 
Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 538).  
 
 At issue in Pet Food Products was that the parties had 
not indicated to the District Court whether the information 
regarding the purchaser subclass existed. Id. We explained it 
might not be possible in every case to “reduce the final Girsh 
factors ‘to a concrete formula.’” Id. at 355 n.30 (quoting 
Prudential, 148 F.3d at 322). We expressed no opinion, in the 
absence of a record, as to whether it would have been 
possible to calculate the best possible recovery for the 
purchaser subclass, and directed the District Court on remand 
to consider whether such a calculation would be possible 
based on additional information from the settling parties. Id. 
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 This case is distinguishable from Pet Food Products. 
Here, the parties presented the Court with a number of studies 
relating to COPR contamination in Jersey City, which put 
forth conflicting views on the extent of contamination and 
migration. The District Court determined the information 
available was not sufficient to put a value on the claims, but 
also that determining the value of the claims would have 
required trying the merits of the case in the context of a 
settlement approval hearing. Based on the conflicting studies 
before it, the Court determined that it was possible to evaluate 
the reasonableness of the settlement in light of the possible 
recovery and litigation risks, and that the settlement provided 
substantial benefits for the class considering the risks. 
 
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
approving the settlement without specifically identifying the 
best possible recovery for the class. As we have explained, 
“precise value determinations are not required” in evaluating 
a class action settlement. Pet Food Products, 629 F.3d at 355. 
The calculations required by the eighth and ninth Girsh 
factors—valuation of the best possible recovery and 
depreciation of that recovery for the risks of litigation—are 
fact-specific inquiries that must be tailored to the nature of 
the claims and the record developed in discovery. In some 
cases, like the consumer claims in Pet Food Products, it may 
be feasible to determine the aggregate value of the class’s 
claims through the use of sales information as in that case or 
other readily available data. In other cases, litigation may 
have progressed through expert discovery, allowing the 
parties to present estimates based on expert testimony. See 
Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 538. 
 
 But in a case such as this, where valuation of 
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plaintiffs’ claims is difficult or impossible without expert 
testimony, and expert reports have not been exchanged or 
depositions taken, the District Court need not delay approval 
of an otherwise fair and adequate settlement if it has 
sufficient other information to judge the fairness of the 
settlement. Cf. General Motors, 55 F.3d at 806 (“The 
evaluating court must . . . guard against demanding too large 
a settlement based on its view of the merits of the litigation; 
after all, settlement is a compromise, a yielding of the highest 
hopes in exchange for certainty and resolution.”). District 
courts may approve settlements in which “calculating the best 
possible recovery for the class in the aggregate would be 
‘exceedingly speculative’” if the reasonableness of the 
settlement nevertheless can be “fairly judged.” Prudential, 
148 F.3d at 322. To conclude otherwise might risk requiring 
parties to continue to litigate cases unnecessarily after a fair 
settlement has been reached. In this case, we believe the 
District Court ably exercised its discretion in evaluating the 
eighth and ninth Girsh factors based on the record. 
 
C. Remediation through the Spill Act 
 In its analysis of the eighth and ninth Girsh factors, the 
District Court explained the release of claims in the 
settlement “does not require giving up [the] ability to obtain 
remediation all together . . . .” The settlement does not affect 
claims for remediation under the New Jersey Spill Act, 
N.J.S.A. § 58:10-23.11 et seq. The Spill Act authorizes the 
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection to direct 
cleanup of hazardous waste spills and recover the costs of 
cleanups from the discharger. See N.J.S.A. § 58:10-
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23.11f(a).9 
 Chandra argues the District Court’s conclusion 
remediation was available through the Spill Act was a factual 
finding that represented clear error because in practice 
administrative proceedings under the Spill Act can take years 
to resolve. Chandra relies on the decision of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey in earlier 
litigation against Honeywell relating to COPR cleanup in 
Jersey City. See Interfaith Community Org. v. Honeywell 
Intern., Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 796 (D.N.J. 2003). In that case, 
the Court observed Honeywell delayed administrative 
proceedings under the Spill Act relating to the Mutual site. Id. 
at 826.  
 
 Chandra’s reliance on this decision is misplaced. First, 
remediation remains available under the terms of the Spill 
Act, and homeowners may still seek remediation through 
NJDEP. Second, the District Court did not commit clear error 
or abuse its discretion when it concluded that Honeywell’s 
actions more than fifteen years ago were not dispositive of the 
present case. For these reasons, it was not clear error or an 
abuse of discretion for the Court to consider the availability 
                                              
9 The Spill Act provides “[w]henever any hazardous 
substance is discharged,” NJDEP “may, in its discretion, act 
to clean up and remove or arrange for the cleanup and 
removal of the discharge or may direct the discharger to clean 
up and remove, or arrange for the cleanup and removal of, the 
discharge.” N.J.S.A. § 58:10-23.11f(a). The Spill Act 
authorizes NJDEP to identify “hazardous substances.” See 
N.J.S.A. § 58:10-23.11(b). NJDEP identifies both chromium 
and “chromium compounds” in its environmental hazardous 
substance list.  
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of remediation under the Spill Act in evaluating the fairness 
of the settlement. 
 
D. Release of “Unknown” and “Unforeseen” Claims 
 Chandra argues the Court abused its discretion in 
approving the settlement because it releases “unknown” and 
“unforeseen” claims. She contends the release in the 
settlement is overbroad. In addition, Chandra objects to the 
release of claims relating to “in ground” contamination, as 
opposed to claims arising out of contamination by air-borne 
chromium dust. 
 
 It is not unusual for a class settlement to release all 
claims arising out of a transaction or occurrence. “[A] 
judgment pursuant to a class settlement can bar later claims 
based on the allegations underlying the claims in the settled 
class action.” In re Prudential Ins Co. of America Sales 
Practice Litig. (Prudential II), 261 F.3d 355, 366 (3d Cir. 
2001). “[W]e have endorsed the rule because it serves the 
important policy interest of judicial economy by permitting 
parties to enter into comprehensive settlements that prevent 
relitigation of settled questions at the core of a class action.” 
Id. (quotations omitted). Accordingly, the scope of the release 
is an important consideration in evaluating whether a 
settlement is fair and adequate under Rule 23(e). See Pet 
Food Products, 629 F.3d at 356. 
 
 In this case, the settlement releases  
all claims stemming from any and all manner of 
actions, causes of action, suits, debts, 
judgments, rights, demands, damages, 
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compensation, injuries to business, loss of use 
and enjoyment of property, expenses, attorneys' 
fees, litigations costs, other costs, rights or 
claims of reimbursement of attorneys [sic] fees 
and claims of any kind or nature whatsoever 
arising out of the ownership of 1-4 family 
residential property in Settlement Class A area 
or Settlement Class C area including without 
limitation punitive damages, in either law or 
equity, under any theory of common law or 
under any federal, state, or local law, statute, 
regulation, ordinance, or executive order that 
the Class Member ever had or may have in the 
future, whether directly or indirectly, that arose 
from the beginning of time through the 
execution of this Agreement, WHETHER 
FORESEEN OR UNFORESEEN, OR 
WHETHER KNOWN OR UNKNOWN TO 
ALL OR ANY OF THE PARTIES, that arise 
out of the release, migration, or impacts of 
COPR, hexavalent chromium, or other chemical 
contamination (a) originating from the Mutual 
Facility at any time or (b) present on or 
migrating at or from Study Area 5, Study Area 
6 South, Study Area 6 North, Study Area 7, or 
Site 119 at any time and into the future, 
including but not limited to property damage, 
remediation costs, business expenses, 
diminution of value to property, including 
stigma damages, loss of use and enjoyment of 
property, fear, anxiety, or emotional distress as 
a result of the alleged contamination. Released 
Claims include claims for civil conspiracy 
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asserted by the members of Settlement Classes 
A and C. Personal injury, bodily injury, and 
medical monitoring claims (if any) are not 
Released Claims. 
 
 As explained earlier, it is important to note that the 
release in this case affects only claims for economic loss due 
to diminution of property value, not personal injury or 
medical monitoring claims. The District Court carefully 
considered the scope of the release in relation to the claims 
asserted in its evaluation of the Girsh factors and concluded 
the settlement was a fair and adequate release of all COPR-
contamination-related claims for diminution of property 
values, in light of the potential recovery and the litigation 
risk. Although plaintiffs did not test individual properties in 
the settlement class for chromium contamination, and the 
studies relied on by the District Court relate to airborne 
COPR dust contamination, as opposed to “in ground” 
contamination with COPR-containing fill, the District Court 
had a substantial record on issues relating to chromium 
contamination and the claims generally. The Court evaluated 
the litigation risks based on causation and statute of 
limitations issues applicable to all claims. 
 
 The thrust of Chandra’s objection is the amount of 
evidence before the District Court when approving the 
settlement was insufficient. We have required the District 
Court have evidence on which to base its evaluation of the 
Girsh factors. See Pet Food Products, 629 F.3d at 350–51 
(“[T]he court cannot substitute the parties' assurances or 
conclusory statements for its independent analysis of the 
settlement terms.”). The determination of whether the record 
supports approval of the settlement and the release is a fact-
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specific inquiry that is within the sound discretion of the 
District Court. Id. at 351. 
 
 We are satisfied the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in approving the settlement that included the 
release of “unknown” and “unforeseen” claims and ground 
contamination claims. Presented with a record developed over 
five years of fact discovery, the District Court was in the best 
position in the first instance to evaluate the fairness of the 
settlement vis-à-vis the scope of the release. Moreover, the 
District Court’s evaluation of the litigation risk was based on 
legal and factual issues common to all claims, specifically the 
lack of evidence of migration, causation issues, and the 
statute of limitations, regardless of factual differences 
between the different types of COPR contamination alleged. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the 
scope of the release not overbroad given the substantial and 
immediate recovery for the class and the risks and costs of 
continued litigation. 
 
E. Class Reaction at July 22, 2015, Meeting 
 Chandra argues the District Court abused its discretion 
in evaluating the second Girsh factor—the reaction of the 
class to the settlement—by failing to consider the reaction of 
class members at a July 22, 2015, meeting with class counsel. 
No formal record of the July 22, 2015, meeting, which 
occurred prior to the close of the opt-out and objection period, 
was kept and no informal records of the meeting were entered 
in evidence at the fairness hearing.  
 
 In this case, the District Court rested its conclusion on 
the second Girsh factor on the very small number of 
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objections and opt-outs relative to the class and the large 
number of valid claims submitted. Only twenty-eight class 
members opted out, a rate of less than 1%, and just three class 
members filed objections.  
 
 A district court is not limited to formal objections and 
opt-outs in considering the reaction of the class under the 
second Girsh factor. See General Motors, 55 F.3d at 812–
813. We have previously explained other evidence may be 
relevant to the analysis, including polling of the class. Id. And 
“vociferous” objections from a small minority of class 
members may overcome a presumption of acceptance by a 
silent majority. Id.  
 
 The settling parties point out that there is no evidence 
in the record to support the allegations made by Chandra 
about what occurred at the July 22, 2015, meeting. Assuming 
arguendo the allegations were supported by the record, they 
would nonetheless be outweighed by the other evidence of 
class reaction relied on by the District Court. The July 22, 
2015, meeting occurred before the end of the objection and 
opt-out period. Thus, any negative reaction of the class at the 
meeting was not reflected in the formal objections and opt-
outs. The informal reactions at the meeting in this case are 
insufficient to overcome the presumption created by the small 
number of objections and opt-outs, particularly because each 
class member received direct notice by mail and there is no 
reason to suspect class members were not aware of the 
objection process. For these reasons, the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in concluding the second Girsh factor 
favored settlement notwithstanding the alleged events at the 
July 22, 2015, meeting. 
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IV. ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) provides “[i]n a 
certified class action, the court may award reasonable 
attorney’s fees . . . that are authorized by law or by the 
parties’ agreement.” “A thorough judicial review of fee 
applications is required for all class action settlements.” 
Prudential, 148 F.3d at 333 (quotations omitted). “The 
standards employed calculating attorneys’ fees awards are 
legal questions subject to plenary review, but the amount of a 
fee award is within the district court’s discretion so long as it 
employs correct standards and procedures and makes findings 
of fact not clearly erroneous.” In re Rite Aid Corp. Securities 
Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005) (quotations and 
alterations omitted). 
 
 Common fund cases, such as this case, are generally 
evaluated using a “percentage-of-recovery” approach, 
followed by a lodestar cross-check. Sullivan v. DB 
Investments, Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 330 (3d Cir. 2011). The 
percentage-of-recovery approach compares the amount of 
attorneys’ fees sought to the total size of the fund. Id. The 
lodestar method “multiplies the number of hours counsel 
worked on the case by a reasonable hourly billing rate for 
such services,” and compares that amount to the attorneys’ 
fees sought. Id. (quotation omitted). We have identified 
several factors to consider in determining whether attorneys’ 
fees are reasonable under the percentage-of-recovery 
approach, including, inter alia, “(1) the size of the fund 
created and the number of persons benefitted; (2) the presence 
or absence of substantial objections by members of the class 
to the settlement terms and/or fees requested by counsel; (3) 
the skill and efficiency of the attorneys involved; (4) the 
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complexity and duration of the litigation; (5) the risk of 
nonpayment; (6) the amount of time devoted to the case by 
plaintiffs’ counsel; and (7) the awards in similar cases,” 
Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 
(3d Cir. 2000), and “(8) the value of benefits attributable to 
the efforts of class counsel relative to the efforts of other 
groups, such as government agencies conducting 
investigations, (9) the percentage fee that would have been 
negotiated had the case been subject to a private contingent 
fee arrangement at the time counsel was retained, and (10) 
any innovative terms of settlement.” In re Diet Drugs, 582 
F.3d 524, 541 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Prudential, 148 F.3d at 
338–40). 
 
 With respect to costs, Rule 23(h) authorizes recovery 
of “nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the 
parties’ agreement” (emphasis added). Rule 23(h) does not 
expressly authorize an award of taxable costs, e.g., the costs 
enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 1920. Such taxable costs “shall be 
allowed to the prevailing party” under Rule 54(d)(1). But we 
have previously concluded an attorney who creates a common 
fund through settlement of a class action under Rule 23 may 
recover all of the costs of litigation, including taxable costs. 
See General Motors, 55 F.3d at 820 n.39 (“The common fund 
doctrine provides that a private plaintiff, or plaintiff’s 
attorney, whose efforts create, discover, increase, or preserve 
a fund to which others also have a claim, is entitled to recover 
from the fund the costs of his litigation . . . .”); cf. Alyeska 
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 257 
(1975) (explaining “the historic power of equity to permit . . . 
a party . . . recovering a fund for the benefit of others in 
addition to himself, to recover his costs, including his 
attorneys' fees, from the fund or property itself or directly 
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from the other parties enjoying the benefit.”).  
 
 In the context of a common fund created by settlement 
of a class action under Rule 23, a district court may evaluate 
taxable and nontaxable costs together in the context of a 
petition for costs. While the authority for the award of each 
type of costs is different, Rule 23(h) for nontaxable costs and 
Rule 54(b) for taxable costs, each reduce the recovery of 
absent class members when deducted from the common fund 
and may be considered together by the court in reviewing a 
proposed settlement. 
 
 We review the District Court’s decision to award costs 
for an abuse of discretion. See In re AT&T Corp., 455 F.3d 
160, 163–64 (3d Cir. 2006). An award of costs in a common 
fund case must be subject to the same “thorough judicial 
review” as an award of attorneys’ fees, because costs, like 
fees, reduce the recovery of the absent class members. See 
Prudential, 148 F.3d at 333. As with attorneys’ fees, “it is 
incumbent upon a district court to make its 
reasoning . . . clear, so that we, as a reviewing court, have a 
sufficient basis to review for abuse of discretion.” Gunter, 
223 F.3d at 196.  
 
A. District Court Opinion 
 Plaintiffs’ counsel sought $2,504,250 in attorneys’ 
fees, $1,140,023.77 in costs, $219,278.87 in claims 
administration expenses, and $20,000 in incentive awards for 
the two class representatives.  
 
 The District Court conducted a thorough percentage-
of-recovery analysis applying the Gunter and Prudential 
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factors. The Court concluded each factor weighed in favor of 
approval of the award of attorneys’ fees, and found, inter alia, 
that the $6,133,447.36 net recovery for the class, the 
complexity and duration of the litigation, the risks of 
nonpayment due to the liability and damages issues, and the 
time and skill devoted to the litigation favored approval of the 
fees. In addition, the Court found the $2,504,250 in fees, 
roughly 25% of the total fund, was reasonable in light of fee 
awards in other cases and what would have been negotiated 
as a contingent fee in the marketplace. The Court then 
conducted a lodestar crosscheck based on time records 
submitted by plaintiffs’ counsel and determined the lodestar 
fee was $9,455,475.66, based on a blended billable rate of 
$342.11. The Court determined the requested fees of 
$2,504,250 was reasonable in light of this lodestar. 
 
 In addition, the Court approved the award of taxable 
and nontaxable costs,10 based on an in camera review of 
                                              
10 Specifically, the costs included 
 
fees for experts or consultants in various 
scientific disciplines such as air transport of 
contaminants, risk assessment, forensic 
reconstruction, toxicology, property valuation 
and economics; mediation fees and costs; the 
costs associated with document management, 
reviews, imaging, copying, Bates labeling and 
productions; the costs associated with fact and 
legal research; forensic preservation of 
electronic files; court fees such as the filing of 
pleadings, subpoena service, and pro hac vice 
fees; discovery such as deposition transcripts 
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expense records submitted by plaintiffs’ counsel. The Court 
concluded the costs were proper because they had been 
“adequately documented and reasonably and appropriately 
incurred in the prosecution of the case.” Halley, 2016 WL 
1682943, at *27 (quoting In re Cendant Corp., Derivative 
Action Litig., 232 F. Supp. 2d 327, 343 (D.N.J. 2002)). 
 
 Because the Court conducted a thorough evaluation of 
the petition for fees and costs and clearly set forth its 
reasoning in approving the awards, we will engage in detailed 
analysis of only the issues raised by appellant.11 See Sullivan, 
667 F.3d at 331. First, Chandra argues the District Court erred 
in analyzing the award of attorneys’ fees based on the amount 
of the recovery before deducting costs, rather than after 
deducting costs, as required by New Jersey Court Rule 1:21-
7. We agree Rule 1:21-7 applies, but conclude application of 
the rule had no effect on the District Court’s substantive 
analysis, and thus the Court did not abuse its discretion.  
 
 Second, Chandra asserts the Court erred in not 
providing detailed information regarding the attorneys’ fees 
and costs request to class members until after the objection 
                                                                                                     
and videos; litigation support costs associated 
with copying, uploading, and analyzing 
voluminous data and document collections and 
costs associated with travel and lodging for 
hearings, client meetings, expert meetings, site 
visits, court conferences, co-counsel meetings, 
document reviews, mediation and meetings with 
opposing counsel. 
11 Chandra does not dispute the approval of incentive awards 
for the named plaintiffs. 
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period expired. Third, she claims the Court abused its 
discretion in awarding costs from the Honeywell settlement 
for costs incurred in litigation against PPG. With respect to 
attorneys’ fees, we reject Chandra’s arguments and will 
affirm. But we will remand for the District Court to 
reconsider the issue of commingled costs incurred in 
litigating claims against Honeywell and PPG.  
 
B. New Jersey Court Rule 1:21-7 
 The District Court granted attorneys’ fees based on a 
percentage of the common fund before deducting costs. 
Alleging error, Chandra contends the Court was required to 
apply New Jersey Court Rule 1:21-7 and evaluate the award 
of attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the fund after deducting 
costs.  
 
 Declining to apply Rule 1:21-7 in this case, the Court 
concluded, as a matter of federal procedural law, Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23(h) supplanted the requirements of New 
Jersey Rule 1:21-7. The Court noted “courts in this Circuit 
seem to consistently award fees based on the gross recovery.” 
 
 In the alternative, the District Court concluded 
application of Rule 1:21-7 did not change its evaluation of the 
attorneys’ fees award as fair and reasonable. The Court found 
the fee award was roughly 25% of the total fund before 
deduction of costs, but only slightly more, 28% of the fund, 
after deduction of the costs. The District Court found 28% 
was also reasonable under the Gunter and Prudential factors. 
 
 New Jersey Court Rule 1:21-7 sets limits on 
contingent fee arrangements for lawyers practicing before 
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New Jersey courts. Rule 1:21-7(c) fixes the maximum amount 
of contingent fee that may be retained by an attorney based on 
the total size of the recovery. But Rule 1:21-7(f) provides an 
exception and allows the court, after written notice and a 
hearing, to determine “a reasonable fee in light of all the 
circumstances.” At issue here, Rule 1:21-7(d) provides the 
permissible fee under the Rule “shall be computed on the net 
sum recovered after deducting disbursements in connection 
with the institution and prosecution of the 
claim, . . . including investigation expenses, expenses for 
expert or other testimony or evidence, the cost of briefs and 
transcripts on appeal, and any interest included in a 
judgment . . . .” 
 
 The United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey incorporates Rule 1:21-7’s limitations on 
contingent fees in its Local Rules. Civil Local Rule 
101.1(c)(4) provides “[a] lawyer admitted pro hac vice is 
deemed to have agreed to take no fee in any tort case in 
excess of New Jersey Court Rule 1:21-7 governing contingent 
fees.” 
 
 We have previously determined “contingency fee 
agreements in diversity cases are to be treated as matters of 
procedure governed by federal law.” Mitzel v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 72 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 1995). In Mitzel, the 
parties disputed whether New Jersey or Pennsylvania’s limits 
on contingent fees applied in a diversity case brought by a 
Pennsylvania law firm on behalf of New Jersey clients in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Id. 
at 415. The Local Rules for the District of New Jersey at that 
time incorporated the New Jersey contingent fee rule as 
federal procedural law through then-Local Rule 4(c), and the 
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District Court therefore applied New Jersey Rule 1:21-7’s 
limitations on the maximum contingent fee. Id. We agreed 
and concluded the New Jersey contingency fee limits 
incorporated in the Local Rules applied as a matter of federal 
procedural law. Id. 
 
 We respectfully disagree with the District Court on the 
issue of Rule 1:21-7’s application to this case. Lawyers 
practicing before the District Court are well aware contingent 
fee agreements will be subject to the limitations of Rule 1:21-
7 as incorporated in the Local Rules. Accordingly, New 
Jersey Court Rule 1:21-7, incorporated in Civil Local Rule 
101.1, acts as a federal procedural rule limiting contingent fee 
agreements in class actions certified under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23 in the District of New Jersey. 
 
 We see no reason why the analysis under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23(h) should supplant the limitations of 
Rule 1:21-7 because the rules are easily harmonized in this 
case. In evaluating the appropriateness of the class action 
settlement under Rule 23(h), the Court considered, in the 
alternative, the percentage of the recovery analysis based on 
the fund after deduction of costs. As the District Court 
correctly concluded, fees in this case are not limited to the 
percentages set forth in Rule 1:21-7(c) because Rule 1:21-7(f) 
applies and gave the court discretion to determine “a 
reasonable fee in light of all the circumstances.” This 
reasonableness analysis was satisfied by the “thorough 
judicial review” we require of all fee awards in class action 
settlements under Rule 23(h). See Prudential, 148 F.3d at 
333. 
 
 In this case, the District Court’s analysis of the fee 
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award under Rule 23(h) is unaffected by the application of 
Rule 1:21-7. The Court expressly found in the alternative the 
fee award was reasonable as a percentage of recovery of the 
fund after deduction of costs. It did not abuse its discretion in 
approving fees that represented 28% of the fund after 
deduction of costs. 
 
 Chandra does not object to the 28% recovery on 
substantive grounds. Rather, she argues that because class 
counsel referenced the 25% figure in its Motion for 
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and the class notice, notice was 
defective under Rule 23. The class notice stated “Class 
Counsel will ask the Court for an award to cover costs and 
expenses, as well as for a fee award of $2,504,250, or 25% of 
the total amount recovered for the Classes.” In addition, 
plaintiffs’ counsel’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees was posted 
on the class website, and also referenced the 25% of the total 
amount figure. 
 
 Rule 23(h)(1) requires notice of a motion for 
attorneys’ fees and costs “directed to class members in a 
reasonable manner.” In this case, notice of the motion for 
attorneys’ fees was provided to the class at the same time as 
notice of the class action settlement. See NFL Players, 821 
F.3d at 445 (noting Rule 23 contemplates “combining class 
notice of the fee petition with notice of the terms of the 
settlement” where practical). We have explained notice to the 
class “should contain sufficient information to enable class 
members to make informed decisions on whether they should 
take steps” to object to the settlement and fees motion. NFL 
Players, 821 F.3d at 446 (quotation omitted). 
 
 In this case, the class received notice of the critical 
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information—the amount of the attorneys’ fees sought—even 
if the percentage stated in the class notice was slightly less 
than the percentage of the fund after deduction of costs. Rule 
1:21-7 affects the District Court’s Rule 23(h) analysis, but 
does not mandate any particular form of notice to class 
members under Rule 23(h)(1). The slightly different 
percentage of recovery stated in the notice to the class did not 
deprive the class members of the ability “to make informed 
decisions” on whether to opt out of the settlement or object to 
the fee award. See NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 446.  
 Because application of Rule 1:21-7 does not affect the 
District Court’s analysis of the fee award and notice to the 
class was sufficient, we conclude the Court did not abuse its 
discretion in approving the fee award. 
 
C. Costs 
 Chandra argues notice to the class of costs was 
insufficient under Rule 23(h) because only the lump sum 
amount of costs sought was included in the notice to the class 
and details of the expenses were only provided to the District 
Court in camera after the objections period. The class notice 
did not include the amount of costs sought by plaintiffs’ 
counsel. The notice explained “it is estimated that each 
eligible property would receive approximately $1,850 in 
payment” but “[t]he exact amount of any final payment to the 
property owners will depend on the Court's award of 
attorneys' fees and expenses, costs of administration, and the 
number of eligible members participating.” The amount of 
costs sought was also included in class counsel’s Motion for 
Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses, which was posted on the class 
website. But the exhibits to that motion provided only limited 
additional details, in the form of general categories of costs 
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included in the award. 
 
 At the fairness hearing, class counsel provided 
additional details regarding the breakdown of costs. 
Specifically, class counsel stated 
 
[O]ut of the 1.1 million in costs that we have 
asked to be reimbursed, about [$]700,000 of 
that goes to experts . . . . About $83,000 went 
for the costs of depositions. That is just the 
transcripts, videos, just the nuts and bolts of the 
depositions. We got about $120,000 in costs 
related to document management, databases, 
things like that . . . . We have legal research 
which was over $30,000. We are going to have 
other incidental costs of phone and travel, of 
mediation costs. 
 
Further documentation of the costs was then submitted to the 
District Court in camera but not provided to class members. 
The District Court approved $1,140,023.77 in costs for class 
counsel, which included $1,085,869.58 in costs incurred in 
pursuing claims against both Honeywell and PPG. The Court 
accepted class counsel’s contention that all costs were 
advanced by class counsel “in their effort to prosecute the 
claims against Honeywell and PPG jointly.” 
 
 In addition, class counsel averred they “reserve [the] 
right to seek reimbursement for such expenses should the 
Class B case against PPG resolve to the benefit of the 
plaintiffs.” Class counsel suggested they “may perform a 
second distribution of expenses to the Class A and C 
plaintiffs based on a recovery from PPG.” 
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 Chandra’s main objection to the award of costs is the 
inclusion of these expenses incurred in pursuing claims 
against both Honeywell and PPG. She contends the expenses, 
even if indistinguishable, should be apportioned equally 
between the Honeywell and PPG classes. To this end, 
Chandra argues that due process requires her to have the 
opportunity to review itemized expense records from class 
counsel. 
 
 We are not persuaded class counsel is required to 
provide itemized expense records to objectors or to the class 
generally to support the award of costs. But if an award of 
costs is approved after in camera review of attorney time or 
expense records, the District Court should provide sufficient 
reasoning so there is a basis to review for abuse of discretion. 
See Gunter, 223 F.3d at 196. The Court addressed Chandra’s 
contentions regarding the expense award only in conclusory 
statements, and provided no reasoning explaining its decision 
to accept class counsel’s contention that commingled 
expenses could not be separated or allocated proportionally 
between the two classes. In addition, class counsel made no 
formal commitment to repay the Honeywell classes 
proportionally for expenses should the PPG litigation prove 
successful. In this context, we will remand so the District 
Court may articulate why the costs were reasonably incurred 
in the prosecution of the case against Honeywell and to 
address the issue of commingled expenses, including, if 
appropriate, by requiring additional information from counsel 
or the parties. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 We will affirm the District Court’s decision to certify 
the class for settlement purposes under Rule 23(a) and (b) and 
to approve the settlement as fair and adequate under Rule 
23(e). We will also affirm the District Court’s approval of the 
award of attorneys’ fees under Rule 23(g). We will vacate and 
remand the District Court’s approval of costs under Rule 
23(g). In so doing, we express no opinion as to whether the 
costs should ultimately be approved and in what amount.  
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